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MUSLIM WOMEN AND SEXUAL
OPPRESSION: READING LIBERATION
FROM THE QURAN1
Asma Barlas

A

t this year’s Macalester Roundtable, we are celebrating, and also
critically evaluating, divergent perspectives on international feminisms. It is in that context that I have been asked to address some of the
central concerns of Muslim women as I perceive them. The open-endedness of both the invitation and the topic seems to make for a relatively easy task; yet this very fact complicates it inasmuch as the
discursive richness of the subject and the profusion of approaches to it
make it difficult for a single person or perspective to cover it comprehensively, or in a manner that everyone will find equally meaningful. I
would like, therefore, to acknowledge from the outset the partial
nature of my own account and its particularized appeal.
Muslims today number over a billion people and live in every continent in the world in conditions of enormous political, social, cultural,
and—though we are insufficiently attentive to it—religious, diversity.
It is therefore reasonable to assume that Muslim women will have different types of concerns depending on where they live and in what
conditions. At the same time, however, it is painfully clear that in spite
of the diversity of Muslim cultures and societies, women in many societies have to endure similar forms of sexual inequality and discrimination. These range from cultural mores and psychological attitudes that
condone bigotry or violence towards women, to laws that refuse to recognize them as legal and moral agents on a par with men, to the
restriction or denial of political-economic rights and resources to them
relative to men. What is more, discrimination, and even oppression,
are often justified by recourse to sacred knowledge or, more accurately, knowledge claiming to derive from religion, including from
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Islam’s Scripture, the Quran. It is this problem — in feminist terminology of sexual/textual oppression — that I will discuss here. Specifically, I will analyze, and also contest, the tendency to read sexual
inequality, oppression, and patriarchy into the Quran. I will argue not
only that readings and representations of Islam and the Quran as patriarchal/oppressive rest on a number of errors, but also that the Quran
can be read as an antipatriarchal text, that is, as undermining the fundamental claims of patriarchies. By illustrating the antipatriarchal nature
of Quranic epistemology I hope to establish the continuing relevance
to Muslims of their Scripture for (re)theorizing women’s and men’s
rights.
Two caveats are in order here. First, I do not wish to suggest that we
should (or can) explain Muslim women’s oppression or status, “solely
in terms of the Quran and/or other Islamic sources all too often taken
out of context.”2 As numerous scholars have pointed out, patriarchal
and sexual patterns in Muslim states are a function also of the nature
of the state and political-economy, cultural practices that may have
nothing to do with Islam, the history of a particular society, women’s
social class, the choices available to them, etc. Nonetheless, if we take
sexual/textual oppression seriously, and I believe we must, the issue
of how Muslims read, or — as I will argue — fail to read, the Quran
becomes critical, especially for women. In this context, secondly, while
I am happy to acknowledge my debts to Western feminisms, I must
confess that I do not view the project of women’s “liberation” itself as
being Western or feminist. Rather, I find such a project to be intrinsic to
the Quran’s teachings, which is why I remain skeptical of relying on
Western feminisms and secularism for theorizing women’s rights in
Muslim societies. In part, then, this essay is also an implicit critique of
Western secular feminism.
I begin by explaining my choice of topic and methodology and,
since the latter is likely to generate resistance on the part of some readers, by speculating on the nature of their reservations as a way to
enable a more open-minded engagement with my work.
I. Why this Topic and Method?
My choice of topic derives from my view that the central problem
women face in Muslim societies today is the prevalence of discriminatory and misogynistic practices and ideologies (howsoever defined)
which prevent them from realizing their full human potential and, in
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some cases, from being able to meet even their most basic needs for
survival (as in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan). However, while I am
angered by the discrimination and misogyny of Muslim societies, what
I want to comment on here is not their persistence per se, since there are
few, if any, societies that have managed to rid themselves of sexual
inequality or hatred for women. Rather, what I find significant, hence
worthy of analysis, is the tendency to read misogyny and discrimination into Islam, particularly into the Quran. This is evident not only
from patriarchal readings of the Quran by so-called “Islamists,”3 but
also from Muslim feminist condemnations of Islam’s “own misogynist
bias”4 and of monotheism itself as patriarchal.5 I hope to show that
such views arise not only from flawed readings of Islam, but also from
a flawed epistemology of reading. This argument necessitates first
clarifying the relevance of reading/representations to a discussion of
Muslim women’s oppression and also liberation.
Representations are relevant to such a discussion because, as feminists argue, a society’s constructions of “ideal” women also shape its
treatment of “real” ones. That is why “our understanding of the problems of ‘real’ women cannot lie outside the ‘imagined’ constructs in
and through which ‘women’ emerge as subjects.”6 It is this relationship
between the real and the symbolic that allows feminists to theorize
connections between the “literary and the social mistreatment of
women,”7 and to condemn their “textual harassment.”8 While not all
representations are textual in nature, texts — which are discourses
“fixed by writing”9 — play a critical role in the process of representation as they do in the process of meaning creation. For instance, reading sacred texts shapes our views not only of God, but also of the
nature and roles of women and men, which then can become grounds
for justifying sexual hierarchies and inequalities. However, as critical
scholars of religion argue, the meanings we ascribe to a text result from
the act of reading, which is not only interpretive, but also gendered
(masculinized)10 in nature, as is language itself. (It is this intersection
between sex/gender and reading/ representation that Toril Moi
means to convey by the term sexual/textual.11)
The role of representations and of sacred texts in structuring our
social and sexual attitudes and practices, and the interpretive/masculinized nature of reading/representation, makes the issue of who
reads the Quran and how central not only to understanding the problem of sexual inequality and discrimination among Muslims, but also

119

Macalester International

Vol. 10

to theorizing liberation, especially since different readings of the same
text can yield “fundamentally different Islams.”12
Paradoxically, while Muslim ideas and practices do not always
reflect the Quran’s teachings, these teachings (or rather, our interpretations of these teachings) continue to provide role models for
real/imagined women; thus, historically, the “most positive women of
the Quran, by association, determined the most excellent women of
Islam.”13 This does not mean, however, that there are no interpretive
differences among Muslims about the Quran’s teachings about women
or that Muslim constructions of “the female” came “ready-made;”
rather, these were “established in an active battle in history, when particular interpretations won out over others.”14 I have argued at length
elsewhere that reasons why certain interpretations of the Quran (hence
also of women’s rights) won out over others have to do not with the
Quranic text, but with the contexts and methods of its reading(s).15 The fact
that the Quran has been read as a patriarchal text (i.e., as a text that
privileges males and teaches the precepts of female inferiority and subordination to men), has to do with (a) its readings in/by patriarchies,
(b) by means of a conservative method authorized by a handful of
male scholars during the Middle Ages, (c) with the backing of the state,
which became involved in defining religious knowledge from very
early times. That is why an analysis of the extratextual contexts in
which Muslims have read the Quran and the methods they have
employed to read it (hermeneutics and history together) is integral to
explaining conservative readings of it today.
If my choice of topic assumes the interconnectedness of the
hermeneutic and existential questions — i.e., between how we create
religious meaning/knowledge and women’s oppression/ liberation —
its treatment is a function largely of my own epistemic stance as a
“believing woman,” to use a Quranic term. Briefly, this means that my
belief in God, rather than in an androcentric humanism, shapes my
approach to knowledge. In fact, insofar as humanism’s man-centeredness has enabled the “Othering” of woman while claiming to liberate
both from God, I question its soundness as a framework for theorizing
women’s rights even in secular contexts. Second, I regard the Quran as
Divine Discourse (God’s Speech) and, in keeping with an old tradition
in Muslim theology, distinguish between this Discourse and its
“earthly realization.”16 Thus, what I question is not the Quran but its
oppressive interpretations, and the sacrilegious idea that only some of
us (males) can know its real meaning, claims implicit in confusing the
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Quran with its exegesis. Finally, while recognizing both the influence
of gender on reading and the masculinist nature of Scriptural exegesis
(in every religion, not just Islam), I also hold that reading is a function
not only of who reads (sex/gender), but also of how (method). I thus
never rule out the possibility that men, no less than women, can read
for liberation and that a mutually shared discourse of meaning and
care among believing women and men therefore is possible. Indeed, as
the Quran teaches, it is essential if we are to develop moral individualities and communities.
To speak from these vantage points — i.e., to speak as a Muslim in a
secular society that is not invested positively in religion, to say nothing
of Islam — is to speak from a position that is doubly precarious and
likely to encounter a priori resistance. Thus, while readers may be
aware of the ways in which my being a Muslim is integral to my argument, they may be less aware of the extent to which their own reactions and resistance to it may arise from their recognition of this fact. In
speculating on the nature of this resistance, I am assuming that uncovering the preexisting biases we bring into the process of interpretation
renders it more productive.
II. Resisting my Argument
The people most likely to be a priori resistant to my argument will be
those who think of Islam as a patriarchal religion and who hold that
only fundamentalists or apologists can conceivably defend it. Such
people, however, ignore not only the interpretive/masculinized
nature of reading, but also the fact that every text has multiple meanings and that there are always disjunctures between theory and practice, i.e., between what a religion teaches and how we practice it.
(Certainly Muslim practices are not always congruent with the
Quran’s teachings, as I will argue in Section III). Some resistance to my
argument may also stem from the fact that the dominant discourses on
Islam, particularly as exemplified by the media, still remain within
narrowly essentialist confines that discourage viewpoints favorable to
it. The secular suspicion and, indeed, hostility toward religion may
also lead some people to assume that — as I have been told by otherwise discerning colleagues — one cannot be both a believer and an
intellectual, but must choose between them. That is, the lack of belief in
God or, better yet, belief in the lack of God — i.e., a complete “absence
of doubt”17 about the Divine — qualifies one to be an intellectual! This
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faith/reason binary — which was not always natural to Western
thought — may make some sense in the light of specific White/Western readings of, and experiences with, Christianity; the Crusades, the
“Holy Inquisition,” and colonialism come readily to mind. However,
the Quran teaches us not to pit faith against reason by affirming that
we can only come to know God by exercising our intellect/reason (aql),
and by acquiring knowledge (ilm). Aql and ilm are therefore the foundation of both Faith and hermeneutic rationality in Islam, which is
why Muslims like me feel no qualms in defining ourselves as believing
intellectuals.
Finally, those people may also find some of my claims unsettling
who consider Judaism, Christianity, and Islam or, alternatively, the
West/non-West, to be so radically different as to belong to “wholly
different” categories, in the memorable words of an old Orientalist.
Such views manifest themselves in the customary tendency to co-opt
Judaism and Christianity into the rubric of “Western” religions while
consigning Islam to the category of “Eastern/Other,” a process of misnaming that ignores the Middle Eastern origins and scripturally linked
nature of all three faiths and the commonality of some of their truthclaims. To assume a shared humanity or truth-claims, however, is to
threaten the “West’s” notions of its own specificity and the hyperseparation many people here wish to retain between themselves and their
“Barbaric Others.”18 Yet, I remain optimistic that awareness of such
obstacles to understanding is the first step in transcending them.
III. Representing Islam as Patriarchal
Patriarchal readings of the Quran, as well as representations of Islam
as patriarchal, are not unrelated, but I examine them separately in the
interest of clarity. It might make more sense to begin by discussing
Muslim readings of the Quran since, presumably, it is a patriarchal
exegesis that fosters repressive practices and thus also representations
of Islam as oppressive. I will, however, begin with the latter because
readers are likely to be more familiar with them and also because it
will allow me to dispel some misconceptions about Islam early on in
my essay.
Representations of Islam and monotheism as “patriarchal,” though
popular, can be faulted on at least three counts. First, they rest on a
simple but grievous methodological confusion between a
religion/sacred text and a particular, patriarchal, reading of it; i.e., they
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confuse Divine Discourse with its exegesis (and Islam with Muslims).
The fact that it is feminists who use such representations is ironic given
that it is feminists who have been the first to theorize the gendered
nature of representation, reading, and language itself, in conditions of
actually existing patriarchy. Confusing a sacred text/religion with a
specific reading of it also ignores the hermeneutic principle of textual
polsemy; that is, the fact that all texts are open to multiple and even
oppositional readings since every text has multiple meanings. However, if we can read every text in multiple modes, how can we reasonably insist that the Quran alone can be read in only one, or have just
one set of (patriarchal, sexist) meanings? To insist that it does is to put
oneself in the same league as the so-called “fundamentalists” who also
claim interpretive privilege by implying Scriptural monosemy (the
false idea that the Quran has only “x” meaning which only they know).
Not only feminist, but also hermeneutic, epistemology thus demands
that we distinguish between a text and its mis/readings, as Muslim
theology has done from earliest times. However, just because we can
read a text differently does not mean that every reading is equally
legitimate. Indeed, the task of hermeneutics — defined variously as the
philosophy, method, and critique of interpretation — is to enable judgments about con/textual legitimacy. (For Muslims, the insight that not
all readings of it may be right originates in the Quran itself; see Section
V.)
Representations of Islam as patriarchal are also ahistorical. As a cursory reading of history reveals, even the forms that discrimination and
misogyny have acquired among Muslims are not unique to them.
Rather, ideas of female inferiority and male privilege, veiling and segregating women, polygyny, wife-beating, etc., were customary among
the ancient Greeks and even in societies with goddess cults. Feminists
themselves have traced the processes by which ancient misogynistic
beliefs and practices percolated into Jewish, Christian, and eventually
Muslim religious traditions thereby distorting them. For instance, Leila
Ahmed19 shows how “preexisting” misogyny was incorporated “seamlessly” into Islam during the Middle Ages, shaping Muslim discourses
on women and gender in years to come. Barbara Stowasser,20 on the
other hand, details the role of Muslim exegetes (many of them Christian and Jewish converts) in introducing into Islam ideas originating in
Biblical traditions by way of their exegesis (interpretation) of the
Quran (tafsir), and the narratives recording the life and sayings of the
Prophet Muhammad (Ahadith). As a result, the Quran’s teachings are
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overlaid by an exegesis that often misrepresents them in fundamental
ways. For instance, the secondary religious texts assert that Eve was
created from Adam’s rib (as a way to establish a “hierarchy of being”21
based on its temporalization), and that she brought about the Fall, a sin
for which all women are said to have been punished by painful childbirth and menstruation. In contrast, the Quran teaches that creation
originated in a single nafs (feminine plural for self); it does not state
that man (Adam is a generic name for human) was created before
woman, or that she was a product of his body, or that she was responsible for the Fall. Indeed, there is no concept in Islam of the Fall, which
is based on Biblical temporalizations of the rift between God and
humans and incarnates the moment of their mutual rupture and alienation.22 In Islam, on the other hand, God’s expulsion of humans from
Paradise also opens up the possibility for them to receive immeasurably of God’s Mercy. Nor does the Quran treat childbirth or menstruation as punishments for women or for designating them inferior to
men or as inherently unclean. Similarly, the Muslim tendency to deny
“female rationality and female moral responsibility” also derives from
“Bible-related traditions,”23 and contradicts the Quran’s definition of
women and men as equally responsible moral agents. In the same vein,
Muslim representations of certain women figures in the Quran is also
“achieved by way of adaptation of Bible-related lore”24 rather than by
adherence to the Quran’s own teachings.
That we accept such repressive traditions and practices as Islamic is,
I believe, less a commentary on Islam than it is on our own misreadings of it, and on our shared history as Muslims and nonMuslims/Westerners. In the latter context, an argument can be made
that the persistence of many anti-women traditions in Muslim societies
is a legacy not only of a flawed Scriptural exegesis, but also of latterday encounters between Muslim and non-Muslim/Western civilizations. In other words, if the interface between both during the “Middle
Ages” explains the essentially similar nature of misogyny and discrimination in them at that point in time, the modern enterprise of Western
colonialism may explain the persistence and specificity of misogyny
and discrimination in Muslim societies today. To simplify a complex
argument: Western colonialism, which came, it said, to liberate us from
our cultural and religious heritage, actually occasioned the reentrenchment of many practices and symbols (notably, the veil) which Muslims
came to see as markers of their identities, hence differences from the
West. In the process, the pre/anti-Islamic and oppressive nature of
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many of these symbols and practices was elided. Ironically, then, both
the assimilation of non-Muslim/Western ideas and customs into Islam
and attempts to resist assimilation may explain many of the transmutations and distortions that exist within Islam today.
I make these points not to exonerate Muslims or to put all the blame
on the “Western/ outsider” for the ills of Muslim societies, but in the
interest of historical accuracy, and to dispel certain fallacies about
Islam. One is that Muslim exegesis of the Quran reflects its teachings
accurately, as do Muslim practices, such that if sexual oppression
exists in Muslim societies, it must be because Islam sanctions it. (The
fact that Muslim patriarchies historically have been oppressive and
have misrepresented their own oppressive practices as Islamic naturally lends credence to such views.) Another misconception is that
Western civilization has had no hand in shaping the sexual/social
practices of the Islamic world, a myth sustained by representations of
“Islam” and “the West” as mutually exclusive and hermetically sealed
universes totally segregated from one another.
Yet, there are limits to using history (or the West) as alibis for
explaining Muslim women’s oppression, which I view also, and
largely, as resulting from Muslim misreadings of the Quran.
IV. Reading Inequality and Oppression into the Quran
Most anti-women ideas among Muslims, as well as practices like
female circumcision and stoning to death for adultery, predate Islam
and do not originate in, nor are they endorsed by, the Quran. But this
does not mean that Muslims have not derived theories of inequality
and male privilege from the Quran. Specifically, its different treatment
of women and men with respect to marriage (especially polygyny),
divorce, evidence, inheritance, etc., and a couple of lines in the text
(“men have a degree above women,” and “men are in charge of the
affairs of women [in that] God has preferred them”), are all read as
establishing the Quran’s advocacy of sexual inequality and patriarchy.
However, there are a number of problems with such readings.
First, even feminists (who do not always agree on what sexual
equality is) now agree that “(s)imple equality principles have...proven
inadequate for feminist practice,” especially in the “area of sexuality.”25
Moreover, a growing literature suggests that treating women and men
differently does not in itself amount to treating them unequally, particularly if differences in treatment are not premised in claims about sexual
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(biological) differentiation.26 The Quran’s different treatment of
women and men is not, in fact, premised in such claims (see Section V);
rather, it is a function of the rights and responsibilities of individuals in
a given situation. For instance, a brother inherits twice the share of his
sister from their parents’ property (and a mother twice that of a father
from the property of their children), but this unequal division has to be
seen in the context of the fact that husbands, not wives (even if independently wealthy), have been charged with the responsibility of
maintaining their families. Likewise, the Quran’s stipulation that two
women, in place of one man, can serve as witnesses to the transaction
of a debt, does not mean that it regards the woman’s testimony as
being half a man’s, as Muslim patriarchies hold. In the far more consequential matter of adultery, when a husband accuses his wife but is
unable to produce four witnesses to the fact, the Quran gives greater
weight to the wife’s testimony on her own behalf than the husband’s
against her. If she swears her innocence, he can have no further legal
recourse against her. Similarly, although the Quran permits polygyny
in certain cases, it is not because it privileges males but, strange as it
may sound to us today, because it wishes to ensure justice for the most
vulnerable women in society: the orphans.
Give the orphans their property, and do not
exchange the corrupt for the good [i.e., your
worthless things for their good ones]; and devour
not their property with your property; surely
that is a great crime.
If you fear that you will not act justly
towards the orphans, marry such women
as seem good to you, two, three, four;
but if you fear you will not be equitable,
then only one, [aw] what your right hands own
so it is likelier you will not be partial.27

These verses are said to have been revealed after a battle in which
many Muslim men lost their lives and many women were left as widows and orphans. It is the Quran’s desire to protect these women, left
without support in a predatory/tribal/patriarchal society, that fuels its
sanction for polygyny which is, nonetheless, made contingent on three
criteria: it is restricted to orphans, its purpose is to ensure justice for
them, and it is not right if it results in injustice to the wife. That injustice
may be inherent in a polygynous situation is clear not only from the
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last line of this verse, but also from another verse which warns men
that “you will not be able to be equitable between your wives, be you
ever so eager.”28 Yet another verse reminds men that “God has not
made for any man two hearts,” implying that a man cannot love two
women equally.29 Together, then, these verses can be read as presenting a case against polygyny, which is never presented as catering to
men’s sexual needs or as a universal male prerogative.
Misrepresentations of the Quran’s position on polygyny reveal
another problem with patriarchal readings: their tendency to quote
selectively from the Quran, thereby distorting and, in some cases, subverting its intent and teachings. For instance, the claim that the Quran
establishes males as superior to women derives from misreading a reference to a husband’s rights in a divorce:
Women who are divorced shall wait, keeping themselves apart, three
(monthly) courses. And it is not lawful for them that they conceal that
which Allah has created in their wombs if they believe in Allah and the
Last Day. And their husbands would do better to take them back in that
case if they desire a reconciliation. And [(the rights) due to the women
are similar to (the rights) against them, (or responsibilities they owe)
with regard to] the ma’ruf (kindness) and men have a darajah (degree)
above them (feminine plural). Allah is Mighty, Wise.30

Read in context, the degree refers not to men’s rights in general, or to
their biological or ontological status as males, but to the husband’s
right either (a) to divorce his wife without outside arbitration (the wife
requires such arbitration even though the Quran does not stipulate it,
as Wadud notes), or (b) to rescind a divorce.31 Since the Quran mentions
kindness and reconciliation in the same verse, the latter seems to be a
more plausible reading.
Similarly, the claim that God has preferred men to women and
made them rulers over women arises from reading only parts of a
verse and from misinterpreting three words in it:
Men are [qawwamuna ’ala] women [on the basis] of what Allah has [preferred] (faddala) some of them over others, and [on the basis] of what
they spend of their property (for the support of women). So good
women are [qanitat], guarding in secret that which Allah has guarded.
As for those from whom you fear [nushuz] admonish them, banish them
to beds apart, and scourge them. Then, if they obey you, seek not a way
against them.32
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The primary meaning of qawwamun is financial maintainer, not ruler,
argue Wadud and Azizah al-Hibri. The verse is thus charging husbands with the responsibility of maintaining women in those cases
where they have a larger share in inheritance than the women (in
which some of them have been preferred), and they are supporting
women from it.33 Since men can only be “ ‘qawwamun’ over women in
matters where God gave some of the men more than some of the
women, and in what the men spend of their money, then clearly men as
a class are not ‘qawwamun’ over women as a class,” concludes alHibri.34 In addition, Wadud’s analysis of the words “qanitat” and
“nushuz” show why they need not be read as referring to the wife’s
conduct vis-à-vis her husband or as justifying his abuse of her.35
Other examples illustrate that Muslims read inequality and even
oppression into the Quran by generalizing what is specific in it and by
decontextualizing it.36 Yet, in the end, a patriarchal exegesis results not
only from a flawed hermeneutics, but also from a flawed theology.
V. Reading Liberation from the Quran
A liberatory hermeneutics of the Quran and a liberatory theology must
begin by recognizing that, since there is perfect congruence between
Divine Ontology and Divine Discourse, we need to connect God to
God’s Speech by making “God’s Self-Disclosure the hermeneutic site from
which to read the Quran.”37 That is, since God’s Speech and God’s Being
as described in the Quran (God’s Self-Disclosure) are congruent, we
need to base our exegesis of one in our understanding of the other.
Thus far in my work, I have explored the exegetical implications of
only three of God’s attributes out of the ninety-nine named in the
Quran — God’s Unity, Justness, and Inimitability — which I will summarize very briefly.
The attribute of God’s Unity or Oneness (Tawhid) stipulates that
God’s Sovereignty/Rule are Indivisible (cannot be shared with others)
and no one can claim any form of rule/sovereignty that either alleges
to be coterminous with God’s Rule, or conflicts with it. Inasmuch as
theories of male privilege do both—by drawing parallels between God
and fathers/husbands, misrepresenting males as intermediaries
between women and God, or as rulers over women and thus entitled
to their obedience — they violate the concept of Tawhid and must be
rejected as un-Quranic. The attribute of God’s Justice, on the other
hand, maintains that though “severe, strict and unrelenting” in justice,
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God “never does any zulm to anybody.”38 In other words, God does not
“act in such a way as to transgress the proper limit and encroach upon
the right of some other person,”39 which is the meaning of zulm
employed in the Quran. Even if we define zulm differently, we cannot
regard inequality, discrimination, and hatred as not being zulm. To the
extent that patriarchy is based in all three, it can be said to constitute a
manifest case of zulm and we must assume, again as a hermeneutic principle, that the Quran cannot condone it. An exegesis that alleges to the
contrary should be rejected as a misreading inasmuch as it attributes
zulm to God. Finally, the doctrine of God’s Incomparability, which
states that God is Unrepresentable, encourages us to reject God’s
engenderment, even at a linguistic level (“He”). This is crucial since
misrepresentations of God as Father/male also underwrite sexual hierarchies and oppression in religious contexts.
In addition to God’s Self-Disclosure, the Quran also provides
hermeneutic keys for reading it, in its support for the principles of textual holism, con/textual legitimacy, and analytical reasoning. The
Quran’s recognition of its own textual/thematic unity is clear from its
warning not to break it “into parts,40 or to “change the words/From
their (right) places/ And forget a good part of the Message.”41 It is also
clear from the Quran’s praise for those who recognize that all of it is
from God, i.e., those who view it as a totality. That not every reading of
it may be appropriate emerges from the Quran’s approval of those
“who listen to the Word and follow the best (meaning) in it,”42 and its
criticism of those who focus only on its “allegorical [verses]/ Seeking
discord, and searching/ For its hidden meanings.”43 (While we may
hesitate on the issue of the best meaning of every verse, we cannot
regard a reading which imputes zulm/injustice to the Quran as the
best, for reasons I have suggested.) The Quran also distinguishes
between itself and its (mis)readings by condemning those “who write/
The Book with their own hands,/ And then say: ‘This is from God.’ ”44
Indeed, the Quran is insistent that “those who are bent on denying the
truth attribute their own lying inventions to God.”45 While this is a reference to the hypocrites of the Prophet’s time, I believe it serves also as
a warning to exegetes. Finally, the Quran urges believers to use their
own aql (intelligence, reasoning) to decipher God’s signs for themselves while condemning anchorites and priests for leading people
away from God (which may be why the Quran does not sanction a
clergy that can claim interpretive privilege).
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The Quran’s auto-hermeneutics is sophisticated and complex and I
have outlined it here in barest detail in order to show why it can generate an antipatriarchal exegesis. However, to establish the Quran as an
antipatriarchal, or even as a patriarchal, text, we need to define patriarchy itself, which no reader of the Quran has done. In my own reading, I work with both a narrow and a broad definition so as to make it
as comprehensive as possible. On the one hand, I define patriarchy as
“a historically specific mode of rule by fathers/males that, in its religious and traditional forms, assumes a real/symbolic continuum
between the “Father/fathers,” i.e., between a patriarchal view of God
as Father/male, and a theory of father-right, extending to the husband’s claim to rule over his wife.”46 On the other hand, I also define
patriarchy as a politics of male privilege and sexual differentiation
which equates sex with gender and “prioritizes the male while making
the woman different (unequal), less than, or the ‘Other.’ ”47 However,
whether we use the specific or the general definition of patriarchy, we
cannot find support for it in the Quran; indeed, its teachings challenge
the central claims of both.
Thus, not only does the Quran repudiate the patriarchal construct of
God as Father, but it also condemns sacralizations of prophets as
fathers. It also characterizes the rule of fathers (“following the ways of
our fathers”) as being antithetical to God’s Rule. In fact, one of Islam’s
most radical moves against patriarchy is to displace the rule of
father/husband in favor of God’s Rule. This emerges not only from the
Quran’s relentless denunciations, in dozens of verses and contexts, of
the rule of unbelieving fathers, but also from its treatment of believing
fathers as illustrated by the lives of the prophets Abraham and
Muhammad.48 Thus, Abraham’s break with his own father and his
vision, first to sacrifice his son and then not to, all illustrate this displacement of the father’s will/rule by God’s Will/Rule. On the one
hand, God approves of Abraham’s break with his unbelieving father
and also saves him from the latter’s punishment, establishing the legitimacy of disobedience to unbelieving fathers and of obedience to a
Merciful God. On the other hand, however, God also curtails Abraham’s rights as father twice: once by giving him the vision to sacrifice
his son — which can only proceed in the Quran when the son himself
freely consents to it, indicating that it is not simply a question of Abraham exercising unquestioned patriarchal authority — and then in commanding Abraham not to proceed with the sacrifice, establishing the
primacy of God’s Will/Rule over the rights of even believing fathers.
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Indeed, it is a believing father’s “willingness to submit his will to God’s
Will; i.e., to yield up his rights as father/man” that establishes him as a
believer, as Abraham’s narrative illustrates.49 Similarly, in spite of the
fact that the Quran describes the Prophet Muhammad as being
“closer” to believers than their “own selves,”50 it also declares that
“Muhammad is not the father of any of your men, but the Messenger
of God and the seal of Prophets.”51 While this verse is read as clarifying
the Prophet’s relationship to his adopted son, it is significant for its
refusal to sacralize the Prophet as real/symbolic father, showing yet
again the Quran’s abiding resistance to the patriarchal paradigm of the
Father/fathers. This resistance illustrates a cardinal tenet of Islamic
monotheism: the primacy and inviolability of God’s Rights/Rule,
which holds that submission to God, not fathers (patriarchy in the traditional sense), defines moral agency. It is for the same reason that the
Quran does not valorize husbands as rulers/guardians over women,
or as heads of households.52
Although many feminists condemn Islam’s “uncompromising
monotheism,” it is this very inflexibility about the primacy of God’s
Rule that opens up possibilities for radical equality for women inasmuch as God’s Rule is not based in the idea of sexual differentiation, hence
in a theory of sexual inequality. That is, while the Quran recognizes sexual (biological) differences, it does not assign sex/biology or
sexual/biological difference symbolic or normative value. It does not
link sex with gender. Consequently, the Quran does not teach what
Thomas Laqueur calls “a biology of sexual incommensurability,”53 i.e.,
the notion “that there are two stable, incommensurable, opposite sexes
and that the political, economic, and cultural lives of men and women,
their gender roles, are somehow based on these ‘facts.’ ”54 This “twosex model,” which is at the core of modern Westernized misogyny,
assumes that biological differences between males and females, hence
between men and women, render them “different in every conceivable
aspect of body and soul, in every physical and moral aspect.”55 The tendency to ascribe “psycho-social distinctions” between women and
men to biological differences56 is common not just to “patriarchal religions” (monotheism), as feminists charge, but also to Western secularism, which also claims that women’s biology renders them deficient in
morality and reasoning.57 At the heart of this claim is not only the confusion of sex (biology) with gender (its social constructions), but also
the tendency to theorize sexual difference in terms not of “(‘pure’) difference but in terms of dichotomous opposition or distinction; not, that
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is, as contraries (‘A’ and ‘B’), but as contradictories (‘A’ and ‘not-A’).”58
The difference, explains Elizabeth Grosz, is that “in relations governed
by pure difference, each term is defined by all the others; there can be
no privileged term which somehow dispenses with its (constitutive)
structuring and value in relations to other terms.” In contrast, distinctions and binary oppositions result when one term nonreciprocally
defines “the other as its negative. The presence and absence of one term
defines both positions in the dichotomy” (her emphases). It is, says
Grosz, this second notion of difference, as binary opposition, that characterizes phallocentric thought. Arguably, however, it is not only the
idea of sexual difference as exemplified by the two-sex model that is
phallocentric, but also the idea of sexual sameness exemplified by the
“one-sex” model associated with the ancient Greeks. In this model,
women and men were arranged “according to their degree of metaphysical perfection;” thus, to be “a man or a woman . . . was to hold a
social rank, a place in society, to assume a cultural role, not to be
organically one or the other of two incommensurable sexes.”59 Yet, in
spite of its view of sex as a sociological rather than an ontological category, this model also establishes man as the Self (‘A’) and woman as
the Other (lesser ‘A’). Elements of both models persist in modern patriarchal discourses in which the woman is “absence, negativity, the dark
continent, or at best a lesser man.”60 In other words, woman is both difference and a lack.
The Quran, however, does not espouse a view of sexual difference
or sameness that coheres with either the one-sex or the two-sex model.
As Wadud says, it “does not consider woman a type of man in the presentation of its major themes. Man and woman are two categories of
the human species given the same or equal consideration and
endowed with the same or equal potential.”61 In effect, the Quran’s
teachings on human ontology, agency, and subjectivity, show that
women and men constitute part of a single totality — that of
sexual/sexed pair — in which it is not the biological sex of either partner, or the specific nature of their sexuality, that is important, but the
nature/quality of their moral praxis. In other words, the only criteria
for distinguishing between humans in the Quran are ethical-moral, not
sexual: “O [human]! Lo! We have created you male and female, and
have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another. Lo!
The noblest of you in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct.”62 To
clarify:
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morally purposeful action in accordance with Quranic teachings and not
sexual identity, defines human agency and subjectivity in Islam. Not
only does the Quran make no claims about sexual sameness or difference that portray women as lesser or defective men or the two sexes as
incompatible, unequal, or incommensurable, in the tradition of Western/ized patriarchal thought, but — unlike the latter — it also does not
equate sex with given social meanings (gender), or assign specific attributes to either sex.63

That is, the Quran does not define women and men in terms of
sex/gender attributes, much less in terms of binary oppositions; e.g.,
man as logical, woman as illogical; man as intelligent, woman as emotional; man as the Self, woman as the Other. In fact, inasmuch as
humans commence from a single Self in the Quran, there is no real or
symbolic Other. Moreover, in the Quran’s definition of the human
pair, neither half is privileged, as is clear from the Quran’s teachings
on a whole array of issues ranging from marital relations to moral personality to sexual modesty.
In keeping with its view of women and men as equal moral agents,
the Quran holds them both to the same standards of moral behavior
and promises them the same reward for righteousness:
For Muslim men and women,—
For believing men and women,
For devout men and women,
For men and women who are
Patient and constant, for men
And women who humble themselves,
For men and women who give
In charity, for men and women
Who fast (and deny themselves).
For men and women who
Guard their chastity, and
For men and women who
Engage much in God’s praise
For them has God prepared
Forgiveness and great reward.64

That the Quran regards women and men as being equally responsible
moral agents is clear not only from this verse but also from the fact that
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the Quran designates believing women and men as each other’s awliya,
i.e., mutual protectors, or mutually “in charge” of one another:
The Believers, men
And women, are [awliya],
One of another: they enjoin
What is just, and forbid
What is evil: they observe
Regular prayers, practise
Regular charity, and obey
God and [God’s] Apostle.
On them will God pour
[God’s] Mercy: for God
Is Exalted in power, Wise.65

The Quran does not distinguish between the moral-ethical behavior
and potential of women and men, and it also does not distinguish
between their work. It does not define women and men in terms of a
specific social or sexual division of labor, or label work women’s work
or men’s work. This is why it is difficult — if we keep the totality of its
teachings in mind — to view its different treatment of women and men
with respect to some issues as evidence of its support for sexual
inequality. On the contrary, the Quran teaches us a radically egalitarian view of the equal worth and dignity of women that remains unparalleled, even in modern thought.66
Finally, as some of the verses quoted above make clear, the Quran is
rare among Scriptures in addressing women directly. How this came
about is significant for women. Tradition records that when the Quran
was being revealed to the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century,
his wife Umm Salama questioned why it was not addressing women
directly. (Her question seems to have been prompted in part by the
Quran’s mode of address and in part by its language.) And that, we
learn, is how the Quran came to address women as women. This
episode (which shows that some women were critical thinkers a millennium and a half ago) reveals the importance of language in shaping
human subjectivities while also underscoring its limitations as a
medium for Divine Speech. If language did not matter, or if language
were perfect, presumably God would not have responded to Umm
Salama’s question by modifying the Quran’s mode of address and
making women the subjects of Divine Discourse, rather than its objects,
as they are in patriarchal discourses. Indeed, God’s responsiveness to
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women’s concerns is reflected not only in the language of Divine Discourse, but also in its content, which God shaped in light of women’s
concerns as they themselves articulated these during the process of its
revelation.67 Second and more crucially, Umm Salama’s question and
God’s rejoinder to it confirm that in Islam women’s relationship with
God is direct and unmediated and extends to being able to ask questions about, and of, divine speech itself. That is why I believe that if we
continue to ask the right sorts of questions of it the Quran can continue
to speak to us today.
VI. An Epilogue
From the absence of valorizations of fathers/husbands (and, indeed,
from the Quran’s condemnations of such valorizations) as well as from
the absence of sex/gender as a meaningful category in the Quran —
and from the Quran’s insistence on treating women and men as two
equal halves of a single pair in which neither is privileged—I am led to
conclude that Quranic epistemology is inherently antipatriarchal. In
fact, the Quran provides some of the clearest arguments against patriarchy and discrimination in addition to espousing a radically egalitarian view of equality. That is why I believe that movements struggling
for women’s rights in Muslim societies have the best defense of their
cause in the Quran itself. As it happens, Muslim patriarchs try to discredit such movements by branding them “Western/feminist,” implying that there is no room to contest patriarchy and sexual inequality
from within the fold of Islam. However, one can, in fact, challenge both
from within Islam. Yet, as it also happens, many educated Muslim
women are unwilling to do so. For one reason, it seems inconceivable
to a woman who has been oppressed all her life in the name of the
Father and the Scripture that she can read the same Scripture for liberation. For another, many educated Muslim women also tend to confuse Islam with the so-called “Islamists,” with whom rational
discourse seems impossible. And, of course, there remains the critical
issue of the contexts in which Muslims today are obliged to read the
Quran. Patriarchal and, for the most part, repressive societies, with
well entrenched interpretive communities and states jealous of their
monopoly on religious knowledge, are unlikely to countenance readings that undermine their own privileges, as antipatriarchal readings
are sure to do eventually. Struggles for equality, however, have always
exacted a price and the price Muslim women are being asked to pay in
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order to reclaim their sacred text and their right to read it anew seems
modest given how much hinges on retrieving what Leila Ahmed has
called the “egalitarian” voice of Islam.68 This is the voice I have tried to
show of the Quran, which is why a liberatory Quranic hermeneutics
appears to me to be essential to the project of Muslim women’s liberation today.
VII. Responding to my Respondents69
I feel singularly fortunate to have had Laura Luitje and Linda SchulteSasse as my respondents and find their disparate, if always critical,
readings of my essay provocative and energizing. (I have left the main
portion of my essay more or less unchanged from the version that
Luitje and Schulte-Sasse read, so that readers know what they are
responding to.) Since the only thing common to both responses is an
equally careful engagement with my essay, I will answer them separately. This will also allow me to draw out the nature and significance
of these divergent assessments of my work.
Luitje’s critique is remarkable as much for its thoughtfulness as for
the fact that it is grounded in a concerted attempt to engage my work
in terms of its own truth-claims and framework, hence on its own
terms. This strikes me as extraordinary, as does the fact that Luitje
quite self-consciously set out to change the nature of her own foreknowledge of Islam and Muslims as part of the process of engagement
by studying some of the same scholars I draw on. As a result, she is
able to provide not only an internal critique of my paper, but also an
invaluable contextualization of it by emphasizing the rich diversity of
scholarship on the Quran, the evolving nature of Quranic exegesis, and
the role of cultural differences in shaping Muslim interpretations (and
practices) of Islam.
Even as Luitje provides readers a context to understand the specificity of my arguments, she also — gently — takes me to task for having
excluded from my analysis the voice of gender hierarchy in Islam to
which Leila Ahmed refers. She also questions my equation of patriarchy with zulm, rightly pointing out that since most people view
patriarchy as universal and “natural,” they are unlikely to share my
definition of it as a form of zulm against women. Isn’t it hubris, she
asks further, to suggest that there has been something quite misguided
about Muslim readings of Islam for a millennium and a half?
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Yet, eventually, Luitje is concerned not only with such philosophical
niceties but also with real-life issues: how can Muslims revise gender
roles? Won’t people resist egalitarian readings of the Quran? Can there
be a meaningful dialogue between Muslim feminists and the standardbearers of patriarchy? These questions reveal real anxiety that the issue
of Muslim women’s rights not just remain at the level of theoretical
discussions. I just could not appreciate anything more!
It will, perhaps, not come as too much of a surprise to Luitje to
know that I do grapple with these questions in that absent presence,
my book, to which I refer a number of times in this essay. For instance,
I admit that my primary aim is to recuperate the other, egalitarian
voice of Islam since this is the voice we have become least accustomed
to hearing and the voice we most need to recover if we are to develop a
praxis of liberation for Muslim women. The fact that this voice has so
completely disappeared from Muslim religious discourses and consciousnesses so as to require explanation and defense today — i.e., its
very silencing — suggests to me that something has gone terribly
wrong with how we have interpreted the Quran over the last several
centuries. This does seem like an enormous, and enormously conceited, claim to make but, in spite of the uniqueness of the vantage
point from which I make it, the claim itself is not unique to me. It is
made regularly by both conservative Muslims — whose remedial strategy is to “go back” to Islam as practiced by, and in the times of, the
Prophet — and by reformists who have sought throughout history to
re-vision religious knowledge as it existed at particular moments in
time. Thus, few believing Muslims, of whatever persuasion, consider
the Islam we practice today as entirely in tune with its real teachings or
spirit. Of course, we could all be deluded, or we could be acknowledging the simple truth that, as W.C. Smith puts it, “to reduce what Islam
is, conceptually, to what Islam has been, historically, or is in the
process of becoming . . . would be to fail to recognise its religious quality: the relationship to the divine; the transcendent element. Indeed,
Islamic truth must necessarily transcend Islamic actuality.”70 To view
Islam as the embodiment of Divine Truth thus does not rule out the
possibility for Muslims to recognize that our apprehension and actualization of this Truth may be neither exhaustive nor entirely unproblematic, and may need continued revision.
It is in this context that I have argued that our understanding of
Islam depends on how we interpret the Quran. But, how the Quran (or
any other text, for that matter) speaks to us depends also on how we
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ourselves speak to it. We cannot read it as a liberatory text if we do not
ask specifically directed questions of it about sexual equality and patriarchy, questions which the medieval Muslim scholars whose works we
regard as canonical today, did not — could not — ask given what they
did not know about sexual oppression and equality, biology and its
social constructions, the (gendered/interpretive) nature of
reading/language, etc. (This does not mean, of course, that no one has
ever asked the right sorts of questions of the Quran before; indeed, I
gave the example of Umm Salama, but, unfortunately for Muslims, she
remains a rare example.)
Asking new questions and questioning accepted interpretations is
part not only of our evolving knowledge of Islam, but also of the
development of Western science, no less than of Western religions,
both of which have been contingent on questioning existing practices
and paradigms — no matter how extended or hallowed — as witnessed
by the scientific revolutions, the Protestant Reformation, and the
advent of multiple interpretations of Jewish identity.
The real issue at hand, then, is not whether we should question
interpretations of Islam — since we already do — but the terms on
which we should do so. For conservative Muslims, as Luitje points out,
such questioning does not include and may, in fact, preclude new
readings of the Quran, or a revisioning of the Sharia (Muslim law), or
opening up the Ahadith (records of the Prophet’s life) to critical
scrutiny. For Muslims interested in evolving a liberatory praxis, it
seems unavoidable to do all three. This does not mean we want to get
rid of all aspects of the Sharia, or the Ahadith; rather, we want to bring
them more into conformity with anti-oppressive readings of the
Quran. Can these two groups of Muslims come to a shared interpretation of religious knowledge and even have a dialogue? I am not sure.
Even so, I remain sanguine — and hope I have also convinced some
readers — that a Quranic hermeneutics of liberation is crucial for challenging the ideological/theological roots of sexual oppression in Muslim societies.
That I have, in fact, managed to convince not only Luitje but also
Schulte-Sasse (who approaches my work from the opposite end of the
spectrum) of the significance of such a project seems clear from her
response, which says to me that we may disagree on practically everything, but not on the need for me to do what I am doing. Unlike Luitje,
Schulte-Sasse doesn’t have to respect what I believe in order to respect
my right to believe in it. Her response perhaps best exemplifies the
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easy tolerance of postmodern secularism. How, one may ask, could
one possibly cavil at a liberality that allows Schulte-Sasse to support
my right to defend something she doesn’t believe in and even considers — rather good-naturedly — illusory (a benign God, “the” Truth)?
Yet, it is her very willingness to defend something she doesn’t believe
in — or to put it more accurately, to defend the intent of my reading
while taking issue with its content — that makes me wonder if it is not
the mere act of reading that matters to Schulte-Sasse, and whether
there is much point in responding to her critique of its content. Does
the very liberality of her support foreclose the need for clarification
and further conversation? Having reached such an impasse herself,
and having chosen to press on, Schulte-Sasse reveals herself to be less
of a postmodern liberal than she seems. After all, by her own reckoning, a true liberal would have ended the conversation by respecting
my right to do what I am doing. Yet, she does choose to engage the
content of my reading, even if on her own terms and terrain (which is
why I regard her critique as an external one). So, even though I suspect
that our conversation is not meant to foster agreement, I also opt to
continue it, in the spirit of the Quran’s advice to reason with one’s critics in the best possible way.
To me, the most significant point Schulte-Sasse makes is a methodological one: a reading strategy like mine, she says, uses critical theory
to establish the “unfixability of meaning” only to end up positing an
“ultimate meaning” by, in my case, designating the Quran as “the
Truth.” This “discursive switch,” she argues, shuts down my argument rather than opening it up, in the manner of critical theories. I
should point out, however, that it is not by means of a discursive
switch, or by relying on critical theories, that I establish the Quran’s
status as the Truth (for me); rather, I embrace that as an a priori epistemological and theological assumption. Can I still have a conversation
with those who do not agree with my views? Schulte-Sasse’s response
itself suggests that I can.
I will not pursue the question of whether Schulte-Sasse and I could
really understand each other if meaning were, in fact, completely
unfixable. Rather, I will ask why we should confuse the “undecidability” or unfixability of meaning with an absence of truth. To Muslims, it
does not follow that if we cannot “fix” the Quran’s meanings (partly
because its polysemy allows us to render each verse in many ways;
according to the sufi Al-Ghazali, perhaps as many as 60,000) that the
Quran therefore is not the Truth. For Muslims, the undecidability or
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multiplicity of meaning is not a function of content, or of truth-claims,
but of hermeneutics. And it is because hermeneutics alone is insufficient to yield an ethical perspective on the truth that I base my reading
of the Quran in certain epistemic claims about God’s Being.
It may be a similar confusion of Truth with the methods of its
appropriations that also leads Schulte-Sasse to ask if we can, in fact,
“separate the message from its medium” (as I do when I critique not
the Quran but its misreadings), and consider one perfect and the other
flawed. In effect, can we assume Divine Discourse to be pure when its
interpretations cannot be, given the very nature of language? (Of
course, Schulte-Sasse expects me to be able to understand her, irrespective of the problematic nature of language!) I believe we can assume
Divine Discourse to be pure and its interpretations not pure by assuming Divine Infallibility and human fallibility (but we would also need
to view God, not “man,” as the ultimate locus of knowledge and
Truth). To believers, there is nothing illogical about claiming that we
can know God only in our own imperfections, but that our imperfections do not in any way reflect on God. Thus, our flawed and incomplete understanding of Divine Discourse does not render the Discourse
itself flawed or incomplete. If this answer does not engage SchulteSasse, let me raise questions that may. If we do not distinguish
between the message and its medium, we then also give up the idea of
misreadings inasmuch as the text then becomes its (mis)readings. But,
could we then generate better readings? Could Jewish and Christian
feminists, for instance, ever hope to recover the liberatory aspects of
the Bible? Could we even judge between good or bad translations or
interpretations of, say, Marx? Alternatively, would a bad reading be
taken as signifying a bad original? Would bad deconstruction illegitimize deconstruction as a reading strategy? If we treat sacred texts as
being divorced from social practices, as Schulte-Sasse’s reading of
Lessing suggests — it’s not the ring, but the search for it that’s the
point, they say, though I doubt the latter would make much sense in
the absence of the former — then such questions are moot. But, for
those who view the relationship between text and context to be interconnected and thus utterly consequential, they can hardly be.
Then there is Schulte-Sasse’s observation that to establish the Quran
as anti-oppressive to women is not to establish it as antipatriarchal,
with which I agree. Moreover, not only does she show that many of
my assumptions are infused with patriarchy, but she also concedes her
own complicity with patriarchy in her role of teacher. But I thought I
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was trying to establish the Quran as anti-oppressive because it is
antipatriarchal! I thought I made it clear that for me patriarchy is not a
voluntarily inhabitable subject-position, or power imbalance, or even a
vaguely defined gender privilege. If it is, let’s give up any hope of ever
being able to contest it! Rather, it is a specific mode of sexual politics
and sexual differentiation that is based in andronormativity (to coin, if
it does not already exist, an unhappy term for the unhappy practice of
regarding man as normative). In terms of these definitions, the mere
exercise of power by women does not reconstruct them as patriarchs.
Finally, Schulte-Sasse’s critique of Islam’s definition of moral
agency as voluntary submission to God as both paradoxical (to Westerners schooled in individualist ideology) and socially irresponsible, is
perhaps the most disturbing to me. The paradox is easily resolved: do
not Western ideas of the social contract, that fabulous imaginary,
assume that people voluntarily accept certain limits and restraints as
the precondition of freedom? Granted this does not involve submitting
to God, but it does invoke that same bizarre idea of self-restraint, selflimits, and self-discipline that Muslims also invoke when they theorize
agency and freedom as voluntary submission. Anything forced does
not qualify as agency or freedom, much less Faith, given the Quran’s
warnings to avoid compulsion and excesses in religion.
And what about Derrida’s and Kirkegaard’s critique of the Abrahamic narrative of sacrifice as illustrating that moral subjectivity and
social responsibility are incompatible, even as one subverts the other? I
wonder if the debased view at the heart of this critique of both Abraham and Abraham’s God results from an anthropomorphic idea of
God (as sadistic, or capricious), or whether the binary between morality and responsibility originates in the interiorization (by Christianity)
of the idea of a mutual rift between God and “man” as embodied in the
trope of the Fall, which institutionalizes human alienation from God.71
If so, I can only clarify that Muslims do not believe in the Fall nor in the
idea of human alienation from God; nor do we adhere to frivolous
ideas of God. And here, alas, my Faith in the Real and Absolute must
come into conflict with the reality and absoluteness of Schulte-Sasse’s
lack of it. I am thus left to ponder this Quranic verse:
Say: o ye
That reject Faith!
I worship not that
Which ye worship.
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And I will not worship
That which ye have been
Wont to worship.
Nor will ye worship
That which I worship.
To you be your Way,
And to me mine.72

To some, this verse may suggest that it is my religious intolerance
rather than Schulte-Sasse’s liberal tolerance of the idea of the ultimate
nonexistence of truth—which renders God superfluous as its source—
that puts closure to our conversation. But, this time I would like to say
that would be too easy. To me, this verse does not so much end conversation as it clarifies the terms on which a real dialogue can occur. I read
it as suggesting that while we have the right to believe in different
truths, the content of our truths does matter to how, and how deeply,
we can actually converse. Where the content of our belief systems is
absolutely different—even if only in the absolutes in which we believe
(my conviction in the existence of Truth, Schulte-Sasse’s conviction in
its nonexistence) — there must eventually come a parting of ways. One
of liberalism’s dilemmas is that, while enabling this parting, it does not
want to accept its existential implications. It thus continues to foster
the illusion that tolerance of difference constitutes respect for it.
Lest I leave readers with the impression that, prior to coming to this
point of parting, I have not benefited from my conversation with
Schulte-Sasse, I hope that my response will affirm otherwise. She, no
less than Luitje, has pushed me, albeit in different ways and to different ends, to develop and refine my ideas and arguments. So perhaps
there is more opportunity here for a conversation between liberals and
non-liberals, the religious and the irreligious, than such binaries lead
us to believe. Now, whether this exchange remains “mere conversation,” to quote the immortal Paulo Freire, or becomes a dialogue, is a
䢇
rather different question. 嘷
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15. Barlas 2002.
16. van Ess 1996, p. 189.
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